Evolutionary elementary coordination games
2016. 10. 07. 10:15
BME Fizikai Intézet, Elméleti Fizika Tanszék, Budafoki út 8. F-épület, III lépcsőház, szemináriumi szoba
Balázs Király (BUTE Dept. Theor. Phys.)
In many-participant evolutionary game theoretic models pair interactions are described by many-parameter matrix games. Recent studies have indicated that these matrices represent combinations of four basic types of interactions: self- and cross-dependent, coordination-type, and cyclic games. Games with cyclic components are not potential games. Strategy distributions of multiagent evolutionary potential games follow the Boltzmann distribution if the evolution is governed by a properly chosen rule, which means that the tools and methods of statistical physics can be used to investigate the macroscopic behaviour of such systems. We study simple multiagent logit-rule-driven evolutionary potential games on a square lattice, and apply some of these methods to investigate their equilibrium properties and their phase transitions. We find that in elementary coordination games, which closely resemble Ising-type models, the order of the phase transition is determined by the number of available strategies. The introduction of different self-dependent game components can be used to change the critical temperature and the order of the phase transition, and it can even abolish the transition.